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N/A: Hypnosis in Court: A Memory Aid for Witnesses

NOTES
HYPNOSIS IN COURT: A MEMORY AID FOR WITNESSES
When a witness states that he cannot remember, or he gives testimony
that seems false or inaccurate, the examining attorney may request permission to use memoranda,1 business records, 2 or similar aids8 to refresh
the witness' recollection. Although the use of such aids is discretionary
with the court,4 permission is usually granted when their usefulness in a
given situation can be shown. 5 Moreover, since the use of such aids may
often provide the only means of access to relevant facts retained within
the witness' memory, the court should confine attacks to the weight of the
1 E.g., Adamaitis v. Hesser, 56 Ill. App. 2d 849, 206 N.E.2d 311 (1965) (doctor's report);
State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372, 209 A.2d 124 (1965) (confession). It is not necessary
that the writing so used be itself admissible as evidence. Adamaitis v. Hesser, supra at 314.
2 United States v. Riccardi, 174 F.2d 883 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 941 (1949).
3 Compare Thompson v. United States, 342 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
926 (1965), with United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
806 (1947); see 3 WIGMOPE, EVIDENcE §§ 759, 764 (3d ed. 1940); Linn &Wein, Present Recollection Revived-What It Consists Of And How It Should Be Applied, 1957 TRIAL LAW.
GUIDE 337.

McCoRmxcK, EVIDENCE § 9 (1954); 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 765.
5 See MCCORMICK, Op. cit. supra note 4, § 9; 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 725,
755, 994; see also Redmount, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory,
50 J. CRnM. L., C. & P. S. 249 (1959); Evidence-Past Recollection Record-Present Recollection Revised, 63 W. VA. L. Rxv. 73, 76 (1960). See Linn & Wein, supra note 3, at 349 for
the steps in laying the foundation to refresh a witness' memory, which are as follows:
4

1. Establish the fact that the witness has exhausted his present recollection as to tile
transaction that he is to testify about. 2. Evoke testimony to the effect that the witness
has had personal knowledge of the transaction about which his memory is to be
revived. 3. Indicate that there is some device which will refresh the present recollc-

tion of the witness. 4. If any objection is raised, indicate to the court at this point
that the device is being used only as a stimulus to evoke present recollection and not
as admissible evidence of past recollection recorded. 5. Allow opposing counsel

to inspect the device being used to stimulate present recollection before handing
it to your witness. 6. Allow the witness to examine the memorandum. 7. Establish that
the witness' present recollection has now been revived by this memorandum. 8. Have

the witness testify independent of the memorandum.
Some states seem to limit by implication the type device that may be used to refresh
present memory. For example, in Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1707 (1935) provides:
A witness may refresh and assist his memory by the use of any written instrument or
memorandum, provided he finally shall speak from his own recollection thus re-

freshed, or shall be willing to swear positively from the paper. (Emphasis added.)
Query whether § 38-1707 excludes the use of all memory-aids not mentioned therein, or
whether trial judges retain the discretionary power to allow or refuse memory-aids as
they see fit. Cf. Smith v. The Morning News, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 547, 548.49, 109 S.E.2d

639, 641-42 (1959) (refusing use of X-rays as memory-aids reversible error). See GaruN,
EVIDENCE § 130 (1957).

[ 268]
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resulting testimony rather than to its admissibility.6 Further, cross-examination is a sufficient safeguard against false or inconsistent testimony, while

the court can prohibit, in the unusual situation, the use of memory-aids
when prejudice is likely to result therefrom. 7
The psychological basis for the use of memory-aids is the association
theory. According to this theory, the memory of fact A can be brought to
the conscious mind by the recollection of fact B, which is associated in
memory with fact A by temporal or circumstantial coincidence, or some
similar link.8 For example, in Proust's Remembrance of Things Past, the

narrator recalls myriad childhood experiences when he takes a sip of tea
with cake crumbs, one of the narrator's favorite drinks as a child. Similar

impelled recollections are a matter of everyday human experiences. But
since the appropriate stimulus to the associated recollections sought is
usually not known, the courts have been liberal in allowing the use of a
wide variety of memory-aids.9 Naturally, the more relevant the aid is to

the witness' memories of past facts, the greater the chance that the desired
recollection will be spurred to the foreground of consciousness.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the use of hypnosis as a memoryaid for a witness in court. The case of State v. Nebbo will be referred to

frequently during this analysis as presenting one of the few examples of
in-court hypnosis (the subject in this case being the defendant). The advantages and disadvantages of courtroom hypnosis will be weighed, and
6 See Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and PreservedMemory. 40 HxAv. L. Rzv
712, 718 (1927); cf. Linn & "Wein, supra note 3, at 342; Richardson, Evidence: Present
Recollection Revived and Past Recollection Recorded, 12 OKrA. L. Rrv. 165, 167 (1959).
7 See 3 WiGMOmtE, op. cit supra note 3, § 762.
8 McCoRMIcK, op. cit. supra note 4, § 9; ROBINSON, AssocuxmoN Ttoa ToDAY 71
(1964); Gardner, The Perception and Mfemory of Witnesses, 18 CoRNFLL L.Q. 391, 392
(1933). This concept could be open to criticism on the ground that the unrecollected
memories, in being brought to the surface, may be greatly affected by the impelling
memories, especially if the latter are false. See Sperling, The Information Available in
Brief Visual Presentation, 74 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS, NO. 11, pp. 1, 26 (1960). The
reliability of even the basic perceptions of the witness has been questioned because he
tends to reflect "not so much the objective qualities of what has been seen and heard as
the expectations or preconceptions that the observer brings to the event and his 'transactions,' or interactions, with others who may have been involved." Marshall, Evidence,
Psychology, and the Trial: Some Challenges to Law, 63 CoLu.n. L. Rnv. 197 (1963). Furthermore, the witness' recollection of a given event may be altered by influences upon him
subsequent to the event. Id. at 199; see Niederland, Memory and Repression, 13 A.P.A.J.
619, 623 (1965).
9 E.g., Henowitz v. Rockville Say. Bank, 118 Conn. 527, 173 At. 221, 222 (1934); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 255 Mass. 575, 152 N.E. 704 (1926); see Jewett v. United States,
15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926) (dictum). The range of memory-aids allowed in Georgia
are indicated by the following cases: Smith v. The Morning News, Inc., 99 Ga. App.
547, 109 S.E2d 639 (1959) (x-ray photographs); Smith v. City of Atlanta, 22 Ga. App. 511,
96 S.E. 334 (1918) (plat blueprint); Burrey v. Ball, 24 Ga. 505 (1857) (deposition).
10 No. 39540, Ohio C. P., Franklin Co., June 8, 1962.
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possible standards for the admission of hypnosis will be discussed, as well
as the qualifications for the hypnotist and the proper use of hypnotic
examination. A suggested procedure for laying the foundation for the use
of hypnosis in the courtroom will be outlined, and alternative methods of
hypnotic questioning will be considered.
I.

HYPNosis DErINED

Hypnosis has been a controversial subject throughout its long history.
Although used in one form or another as early as the Eighteenth Century,
it has yet to be exactly defined by medical science. The American Medical
Association, in a 1958 report recognizing hypnosis as a useful medical tool,
accepted the definition arrived at several years earlier by the British Medical Association. This report defined hypnosis as
• . . a temporary condition of altered attention in the subject which
may be induced by another person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear spontaneously or in response to verbal or other stimuli.
These phenomena include alterations in consciousness and memory,
increased susceptibility to suggestion, and the production in the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to him in his usual state of mind.
Further, phenomena such as anesthesia, paralysis, and the rigidity of
muscles and vaso-motor changes can be produced and removed in the
hypnotic state."
Despite the acceptance of hypnosis as a distinct state, there are at least
two noted researchers in psychology who have implied that there may be
no such distinct state and that behavior under hypnosis cannot be distinguished from the phenomena of suggestibility and daydreaming encountered in the normal waking state. 12 One of these researchers has suggested
that many of the startling results attributed to hypnosis can be explained
by the conscious desire of those who voluntarily submit to hypnosis to
satisfy the hypnotist by acting as they believe a hypnotized person acts. 13
In effect, the "hypnotized" subject is merely playing a role for the benefit
of the hypnotist. However, while this concept of "role-playing" may explain
some actions of a hypnotized subject and may be supported by the supposed
11 168 A.M.A.J. 186 (1958).
12 Barber & Calverley, Empirical Evidence for, a Theory of "Hypnotic" Behavior:
Effects of Pretest Instructions of Response to Primary Suggestions, 14 PsYcHoLooCAL
RacoRD 457 (1964); Sarbin, Contributions to Role-Taking Theory: I. Hypnotic Behavior,
in HYPNOSIS IN PmRE Iv 147, 154-57 (Moss ed. 1965). See Austin, Perry & Sutcllffe,

Can Somnambulists Successfully Simulate Hypnotic Behavior Without Becoming En.
tranced?, 11 INT'L. J. OF CLrN. & ExP. HYPNOSIS 175, 185 (1963). The authors conclude that
hypnotic behavior could be simulated by subjects without any emotional difficulties or
feelings of guilt concerning their deception.
18 Sarbin, supra note 12, at 168.
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hypersuggestibility of those under hypnosis, 14 the theory apparently fails
to explain the anaesthetic effects of a hypnotized patient undergoing sur-

gery. It is highly unlikely that a patient undergoing a painful operation
would simulate an anaesthetic condition just to satisfy the hypnotist.
Despite the difficulties of definition, it would seem clear that hypnosis
stimulates a hypersensitive reaction to internal and external factors, and
results in the ability to control body reactions to a higher degree than in
the normal waking state. A difference of opinion exists, however, as to the
degree of conscious control a hypnotized subject actually has over his situation. Some researchers contend that the subject has very little conscious
control and will therefore be unable to lie in response to questions asked
by the hypnotist. 15 The hypnotist in State v. Nebb so testified when examined. 16 Other researchers have indicated a belief in a high degree of conscious control by the subject which, when combined with the subject's
hypersuggestibility, tends to make questionable the reliability of answers
given under hypnosis. 17 Nevertheless, it would seem likely that the actual
conscious control of the hypnotized subject depends largely upon the individual differences of each subject and the depth of his trance 18
14 See HULL, HYPNOSIs AND SuGcasTmurY 391 (1933); Hilgard, Hypnosis, in 14 ANNuAl.
REVIv OF PSYCHOLOGY 157, 160 (Fransworth ed. 1965).
15 Compare TrmAUm, HYPNOSES INDUCTION TECHNics 155-56 (1965), with Levin,
Hypnotism in the Law, 1954 INS. L.J. 97, 102; see Hilgard, Lawfulness Within Hypnotic
Phenomena, in HypxosIs: CUmEr PROBLE-MS 1 (Estabrooks ed. 1962). Hilgard offers the
following possible explanation:
Gill and Brenman (1959) solve the problem theoretically by positing an over-all
ego within which a regressed subsystem is set up. The over-all ego maintains its nonhypnotic reality-oriented relationship to the hypnotist; only the subsystem is under
the control of the hypnotist.
Id. at 11. See also Allen, Hypnotism and its Legal Import, 12 CAN. 3. REv. 14 (1934),
where the author suggested a similar explanation when he stated:
It seems that beyond the suggestive relation between the hypnotizer and the hypnotized
there stands also an ego ideal which serves the ends of the total personality and
exercises a continuous control over the relations between the suggestor and the
suggestee.
Id. at 18. But see Wells, Expectancy versus Performance in Hypnosis, in MODE.' HYI'PNOSIS
292 (Kuhn ed. 1958). Wells concludes that the subject under hypnosis cannot resist the
hypnotist's commands.
36 Transcript of Proceedings, p. 9, State v. Nebb, Ohio C.P., Franklin Co., June 8,
1962 [hereinafter cited as transcript].
17 Fisher, Problems of Interpretation & Controls in Hypnotic Research, in Hlwosts:
Cuwr PROBLEMS 109, 114 (Estabrooks ed. 1962); Sarbin, supra note 12.
18 See Pana & Cooper, Prediction of Susceptibility to Hypnosis, 1964 PsYcaoLocA.
REPORTS 251; Wgolberg, The Efficacy of Suggestion in Clinical Situations, in Hvwosis:
CuRRENr PROBLEMS 127, 130-35 (Estabrooks ed. 1962). For analysis of specific differences.
see London, Hypnosis in Children: An Experimental Approach, in HT.nosts iN PE wSzcrvE
86 (Moss ed. 1965) (age factor); Melei & Hilgard, Attitudes Toward Hypnosis. Self-Predictions, and Hypnotic Susceptibility, 12 INT'L J. OF Cu,. & Ex'. H.T.osts 99 (1964) (sex.
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HYPNOSIS AS AN AID TO RECALL

While hypnosis has been gaining increased notice in legal circles as an
effective basis for psychiatric testimony concerning the mental state of parties involved in court actions, 19 there has been little exploration into the
possibility of using hypnosis in the courtroom itself. Arguments can be
made that hypnosis is too dramatic to be carried on in the courtroom and
might unduly influence both judge and jury; and that the difficulties of
examination and cross-examination are too great in comparison to the resulting informative value of hypnotic testimony. However, the experience
contained in the proceedings of State v. Nebb indicates that a re-examination of these arguments is necessary, for as the court recognized in that case,
• . . if we don't allow such voir dire examination as this we'll never
make any progress, we'll never determine what can accurately be sub20
mitted and safely be submitted to a jury.

Recent experimentation and study in the field of hypnosis encourages a
closer look at the possibilities of hypnosis in the courtroom. There are two
primary advantages to be gained in allowing hypnosis as a memory-aid in
court. First, there is clear evidence that hypnotic testimony can be much
more reliable and accurate than testimony given in the normal waking
state. 21 Second, conducting hypnosis in the courtroom permits the judge (or
other fact-finding agency) to determine for himself the merit of testimony
22
or opinions given by the witness or hypnotist.

act of volunteering); Sternlicht & Wanderer, Hypnotic Susceptibility and Mental Deficiency,
11 INT'L J. OF CLIN. & ExP. HYPNOSIS 104, 109 (1963) (intelligence factor). Actually, the
depth of trance obtainable probably depends upon the individual differences
herein mentioned. Unfortunately, to make comparative studies of the results of older experiments on this subject is often difficult, if not impossible, because of the failure of
hypnotists to use similar controls. Correlation of their conclusions or exact duplication of
their testing conditions is beyond attainment. However, recent emphasis by experimental
hypnotists upon the development and use of uniform control techniques promises to lead
to more meaningful and exact analyses of the relationship between depth of trance
achievable and individual differences. This, in turn, can lead to improved research on
the relationship between suggestibility and depth of trance. Increased knowledge concerning the causes of both varying degrees of depth of trance and suggestibility in
particular types of subjects would enable a court or attorney to more Intelligently
determine the reliability of testimony gained from a witness, with his particular Individual characteristics, in a predetermined depth of hypnotic trance.
19 People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963), overruled on
other grounds, 60 Cal.2d 631, 388 P.2d 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1964); Cornell v. Superior
Ct., 52 Cal.2d 99, 338 P.2d 447, 449 (1959); see Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an
Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MicH. L. REv. 1335 (1965).
20 Transcript, supra note 16, at 23.
21 See BRYAN, LEGAL AsPECrs OF HYPNOSIS 196 (1962); Reiff & Scheerer, MEMoRY AND
HYPNOTIC AGE RGaESSION 34 (1959); White, A Preface to the Theory of Hypnotism, In
HYPNosIs I PERSPECTIVE 118, 121 (Moss ed. 1965).
22 TErrELBAUM, op. cit. supra note 15, at 153.
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It has been recognized that a person does not completely forget a past
occurrence,23 even though the memory may not be subject to recall by the
conscious mind. These memories can be tapped either by the conscious
mind through the use of free-association techniques (the approach utilized
by an attorney when he gives a conventional aid, such as a memorandum,
to a witness to refresh his present memory), or by the subconscious mind
through the use of hypnotic techniques. While both techniques must ultimately deal with the subconscious mind, the first technique-that of free
association-often meets the difficulty of repression or distortion of past
memories by the subject's conscious mind. As Messieurs Reiff and Scheerer
outlined in a recent work, memories recorded in the subconscious mind
may be changed or distorted by the conscious mind to fit the changing
needs of the person as he grows older: "The inference is therefore that for
remembrance either the memory traces proper change considerably or the
present personality brings them into consciousness in a changed form, e.g.,
by representing the past in terms of present interests, functions and
needs." 24 An example of such a distortion of a past fact is the innocent
recollection of past details of an automobile accident in such a way that
the responsibility of a friend or loved-one for the mishap is obviated and
shifted to another party. The law has dearly recognized the possibility of
such distortion in its reduction of the weight to be given testimony which
may be self-serving or which tends to benefit friends.2 5 However, because
of the influence of present surroundings and present needs, this process is
a universal one and always occurs to some extent whenever a person tries
26
to remember a past event.
It must be noted, however, that this distortion is not the result of intentional lying by the witness. The most sincere, honest person will not be
able to remember a past event exactly the way it happened, though the
degree of distortion varies depending upon the individual. Hypnosis can
be used in two ways in an attempt to bypass this distortion or even to avoid
the repression of past facts by the conscious mind. First, the hypnotized witness may be instructed to remember the occasion, but to remain mentally
in the present.27 Assuming that under hypnosis the conscious mind is not
operating to a high degree, conscious distortion should be avoided. However, there is a possibility that the subconscious mind also distorts with the
23 See R=
& ScHEnm, op. cit. supra note 21, at 38; Baron, Levels of insight and Ego
Functioning in Relation to Hypnoanalysis, 8 IN'r'L J. oF CLaN. & Lx0. HV.oSzS 141,

142 (1960).
24 RE3Fn & ScHEERm, op. cit. supra note 21, at 39-40.
25 E.g., Monger v. Monger, 390 S.A.2d 815 (rex. Civ. App. 1965) (dead man's statute);
see In re Lynagh's Estate, 177 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1965).
26 See BAaRr, REMMMMERG 16 (1964); Rrx
& ScHEERER, op. cit. supra note 21,
38-39; Redmount, supra note 5.
27 REn 9-SCHEERRm, op. cit. supra note 21, at 34-35.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss2/6

6

N/A: Hypnosis in Court: A Memory Aid for Witnesses

274

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:268

passage of time, and that the mere verbalizing of the past event under hypnosis may lead to subconscious distortion. The second possible way to avoid
distortion is to instruct the hypnotized witness to regress mentally to the
28
time of the occurrence and relate the event as it develops.
Hypnotic age regression is also a special case of resurrection of memory
traces. It makes possible a reinstatement of the forgotten personal past
...here the reference point is no longer the actual present but that
point in the autobiographic past to which the subject has been
29
regressed.
Through the use of this process of regression, the examining hypnotist is
able to obtain a detailed picture of the event free from the personal conscious and subconscious distortions when a witness testifies in the mental
present. Naturally, the testimony of a witness, even when regressed, will be
subject to the inaccuracies of observation or the influence of personal needs
and desires existing at the time of the event.3 0 Moreover, hypnotic regression can only claim to reveal what was seen at the time; it cannot supply
missing elements or correct what was seen. However, the fact that the process can eliminate the distortions in memory caused by the passage of time
and the physical and mental development of the witness makes such testimony inherently more reliable than testimony obtained from the conscious
mind, or even testimony obtained by the use of the method first described.
III.

LEGAL HISTORY OF HYPNOSIS

While there is little case law on the use of hypnosis in the legal process,
a definite impression emerges that the courts have been suspicious of its use.
In one case, Austin v. Baker,3 1 the court's major objection to the introduction of prior hypnosis in an action for seduction was that counsel failed to
lay a proper foundation for this testimony. As the court stated:
There was no attempt to explain how by hypnotic influence the witness
could be rendered unconscious of the various alleged acts of intercourse
had with the defendant, or made to forget in the morning the occurrences of the night before, or how, if there had been the loss of memory
as testified to, it could by means of hypnotism be restored. 2
28 RFIFF & ScHEERER, op. cit. supra note 21, at 52; Lecron, Uncovering of Early Memories by Ideomotor Responses to Questioning, 11 INT'L J. OF CIN. & Exp. HYPNOSIs 157
(1963). But cf. Sutcliffe, "Credulous" and "Sceptical" Views of Hypnotic Phenomena,
8 INT'L J. OF CL. & Exp. HYPNosIs 73, 93 (1960).
29 REiFF & ScHEEaRi, op. cit. supra note 21, at 52.
30 BARTLriT, op. cit. supra note 26, at 31; Gardner, supra note 8, at 400; Marshall,
supra note 8, at 197.
31 110 App. Div. 510, 96 N.Y.S. 814 (1906).
32 Id. at 818.
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The court went on to observe that the witness did not "know, except as
she [had] been told, how she was informed of the occurrences to which she
testified. She [did] not even know that she was hypnotized." 33 Thus, the
court held that the witness' testimony was hearsay, "knowledge not of her
own, but acquired."3 4 While this holding is conceptually correct, its use as
precedent is desirable only if the court goes on to allow hypnosis of the
witness in the courtroom if desired by the witness and his counsel. Otherwise, the court deprives itself and the jury of relevant testimony. It is sug-

gested that if the court in the instant case was not prepared to allow hypnosis of the witness in the courtroom, it nevertheless should have admitted
her testimony as given and allowed the jury to judge its reliability on the
basis of the appearance of the witness and the probability of her story. In
the usual situation, however, the problem presented by this case will not
arise, since the hypnotist, rather than the hypnotized, will be testifying to
the out-of-court hypnosis.
Two cases, one Canadian 35 and one American, 30 have dealt with the admissibility of confessions obtained from a defendant after extensive questioning and after a hypnotist had talked with the defendant. In both cases,

it was held that the government's inability to show that the confession was
voluntarily obtained, and not coerced from the defendant while under hypnosis, rendered the confession, and any subsequent confessions directly resuiting from the hypnosis, inadmissible. In the latter case, the United States
Supreme Court said that the attempt to use such confessions violated due
process when the confession was extracted from a defendant unprotected by
counsel. It would seem, therefore, that the courts were concerned with the
use of hypnosis to extract incriminating statements from subjects who were
without even the protection of their conscious minds. However, the courtroom use of hypnosis on willing witnesses merely as a memory-aid will not
normally involve the self-incrimination problem met in these cases. Only
one case has squarely held that hypnotic testimony should not be considered by a court.
In State v. Pusch,3 7 decided in 1950, the defendant attempted to qualify
his hypnotist in order that he could testify to statements given by the defendant under hypnosis which were indicative of his innocence. The lower
court rejected all such evidence, and the appellate court agreed saying,
No case has been cited by either party relating to the admissibility of
the evidence proffered and no case has been found. We think that the
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.

35 Rex v. Booher, 4 Dom. L. Rep. 795 (1928).
36
37

Leyra v. Denno, 347 US. 556 (1954).
77 NJ.. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950).
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evidence was dearly inadmissible and that no error was committed in
sustaining the objection.38
Apparently the court did not believe that testimony about hypnotic statements could serve any legitimate purpose; however, it must be remembered
that this case was decided prior to medical and psychological acceptance
of hypnosis.
Since the acceptance of hypnosis as a valid branch of medical science in
1958, there have been at least three cases recognizing that hypnosis may
have a place in the legal process. In Cornell v. Superior Court,80 it was held
that a lower court had abused its discretion in not permitting the accused
to use the services of an experienced hypnotist prior to trial to help the
accused remember his whereabouts at a critical time. After recognizing the
value of hypnosis as a memory-aid, the California Supreme Court went on
to assert that "there is no substantial legal difference between the right to
use a hypnotist in an attempt to probe into the client's subconscious recollection and the use of a psychiatrist to determine sanity." 40 However, it
also recognized that "admissibility of any evidence that may be secured
during such an examination is not the question here presented." 41 This
question was presented to the same court, however, in 1968 in People v.
Modesto.4 2 Here it was held that the refusal of the lower court to instruct
on manslaughter was error, in view of evidence of defendant's intoxication
and the testimony of defendant's psychiatrist as to his intent at the time
acts occurred. In a detailed opinion the court, through Justice Traynor,
explained that:
It was error . . . to exclude Dr. Zonnis' proffered explanation of
hypnotic techniques as they are used in a psychiatric examination as
a basis for her expert opinion ....
Although the tape recording of defendant's statements while under
hypnosis might properly have been excluded in the exercise of the trial
court's discretion to weigh its probative value as part of the basis for
the expert's opinion against the risk that the jury might improperly
consider it as independent proof of the facts recited therein, the record
shows that the trial court did not exercise this discretion, but erroneously concluded that People v. Busch . . . required exclusion of the
evidence. In the Busch case we held that the trial court did not err
in excluding an expert's opinion based in part upon an hypnotic examination on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid to
88 Id. at 522.
89 52 Cal.2d 99, 338 P.2d 447 (1959).

40 Id. at 449.
41 Ibid.
42 People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963), overruled on
other grounds, 60 Cal.2d 631, 388 P.2d 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1964).
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show the reliability of hypnosis as an analytical tool or that the expert
was qualified in its use for that purpose. In the present case, however,
Dr. Zonnis was qualified as an expert psychiatrist. The defense offered
to prove that hypnosis is an accepted analytical tool in the psychiatric
profession in determining a person's state of mind, and Dr. Zonnis was
allowed to state her opinion based in part on the hypnotic examinations. Under these circumstances, there is nothing in the Busch case
that would preclude introducing in evidence all of the data on which
she based her opinion.4 3
The court went on to hold that a tape-recording of the psychiatrist's interview with the defendant prior to the trial, while the latter was under hypnosis, was admissible. It must be carefully noted that the court did not
preclude the trial judge from disallowing the admission of hypnotic testimony on the basis of his normal discretion, but rather held that as a matter
of law such testimony was not inadmissible. Thus, where the trial judge has
reason to suspect the reliability of such testimony, he would be able to
prevent it from being admitted as evidence.
Finally, in 1962, hypnotic testimony was allowed to be given in the courtroom in the case of State v. Nebb. Here, the defendant was accused of murdering a woman before several eyewitnesses. A part of his defense was that
he had shot under the delusion that he was shooting his wife. His testimony
under hypnosis greatly impressed the prosecuting attorney and the murder
charge was subsequently changed to a charge of manslaughter, to which
the defendant then pleaded guilty.
IV. THE STADARD OF AccuRAcy
Assuming hypnosis may be of use in the courtroom, what standards must
it meet to satisfy the courts that testimony produced under its influence
has evidentiary value? One standard which could be used is that which
apparently is advocated for the use of lie detector analyses, and truth serum
reports, i.e., the method used must have been accepted in the medical and
psychological professions and be capable of being proven 100 percent accurate.44
Hypnosis has been accepted by both the American Medical Association
and the American Psychological Association as a legitimate psychiatric
method of inquiry.45 And in State v. Nebb, the hypnotist testified that the
statements made by a person under hypnosis would, with "reasonable med43 Id. at -, 382 P.2d at 39-40.
44 See Dugan v. Commonwealth, 333 SAV2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1960). See also McCoamas,
op. cit. supra note 4, § 170; TEnFxAu~t, op. cit. supra note 15, at 154; Kaplan, The Lie
Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in the Law of Evidence, 10 W"-AY L. RE. 381, 385-86
(1964). But cf. People v. Jones, 42 CaL2d 219, 266 P-2d 38 (1954).
45 Moss, HYPNosis iN PERs EcTrvE 57-58 (1965); 168 A.M.A.J. 186 (1958).
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ical certainty," 46 be truthful and correct. He further stated that, except for
47
certain mental disorders, the use of hypnosis would find the facts. Still
later, he said the statements made by the defendant while in a hypnotic
trance were factual. 48 Despite this hypnotist's optimism, however, 100 per49
cent accuracy has yet to be scientifically demonstrated. Thus, under this
standard it is doubtful that hypnosis could meet the required tests.
However, there are policy reasons which indicate so strict a standard
should not be required. First, hypnotic testimony in the court is procedurally similar to conventional testimony; the judge and jury may view the
witness while he is testifying: a careful explanation of the possible dangers
of suggestibility can be given by the hypnotist; examination and crossexamination can be carried on; and the witness can be instructed to behave
as he normally would behave. Moreover, since psychiatric opinions of a
person's mental condition are generally admissible, what valid objection
can be raised to substantive testimony within a witness' own knowledge?
Assuming that the witness can be shown to be in a suitable hypnotic state,
the only ground for objection is that suggestibility and imagination are not
completely curtailed. However, if the examiner is strictly confined by the
court to direct questions, the influence of these elements on the resulting
testimony should be minimal. Statements given by a hypnotized witness in
response to proper examination should be as reliable as the testimony in0
voked by conventional memory-aids in comparable situations.5
Medicine is an inexact science. Medical testimony is, in essence, a calculated opinion based on evidence obtained through approved methods of
investigation. To require a showing of greater accuracy than the science is
capable of producing is unreasonable. Thus, upon a showing that hypnosis
is approved by the medical profession, that the method of examination to
be used is likewise acceptable to the profession and designed to minimize
inaccuracy, and that the results produced will have reasonable medical accuracy, the courts should not hesitate to allow such testimony if invoked by
a qualified hypnotist.
V.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE
USE OF HYPNOSIS IN COURT

The use of hypnosis in the courtroom, rather than restricting its use to
pre-trial hearings or other out-of-court proceedings, has the advantage of
allowing the judge or other fact-finding agency to observe the questioning
and all control tests used by the hypnotist in determining the depth of the
46 Transcript, supra note 16, at 8.
47 Id. at 9.
48 Id. at 11.
49 See TEIraLAUM, op. cit. supra note 15, at 154.
50 See Thompson v. United States, 342 F.2d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
•926 (1965).
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witness' trance. When the witness is instructed by the hypnotist to respond
under hypnosis as he normally would when answering questions, the factfinding agency has the added benefit of observing the witness' gestures, tone
of voice, expression and other reactions not otherwise available to it
through the testimony or affidavit of the hypnotist concerning an out-ofcourt examination. The law recognizes the dangers of hearsay evidence;51
it should also recognize that the hypnotic testimony of a witness in some
instances--when he is a fit subject for hypnosis, when the facts he knows
cannot be gained from available physical evidence of unquestionable accuracy, or when amnesia or shock prevents more conventional questioning of
the witness-is more reliable than the hypnotist's testimony about the witness' out-of-court statements, or even the conscious testimony of the witness
himself.
Furthermore, a careful explanation of the limitations of hypnosis, and
strict control of the questioning process by the court to prevent unnecessary
dramatic flourishes would help prevent the witness' hypnosis from achieving
undue influence in the eyes of the fact-finding agency. In an analogous situation, the demonstration of injuries to the jury has raised the problem of
undue influence. And in this situation trial judges have been able to control undue influence by their wide judicial discretion. However, they have
not denied the demonstrations entirely. 52 They have recognized the informative value which these demonstrations may have when properly presented. It is submitted that hypnotic testimony, like this visual device, also
has an informative value and should therefore be admitted when properly
presented.
51 For instances in which the court has found testimony to be hearsay, see, e.g., Attaay
v. Morris, 110 Ga. App. 873, 140 S.E.2d 214 (1965); Northern Trust Co. v. Moscatelli, 54
Ill. App. 2d 316, 203 N.E.2d 447 (1964); Union Elec. Co. v. Mount, 386 SAW.2d 126 (Mo.
App. 1964). Textual discussion of hearsay can be found in FRyTR, LAW OF EViDLN-CE
AND TRIAL 744-975 (1957); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 243-372 (1962); 5 UlmmoRE, EVmENcE §§ 1361-1426 (3d ed. 1940). Professor McCormick defines hearsay as
testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein,
and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.
McComc2., op. cit. supra note 4, § 225. He goes on to state that the "principal reasons
for the exclusion of hearsay [are] namely the want of the normal safeguards of oath.
confrontation and cross-examination for the credibility of the out-of-court decarant."
Ibid.
52 E.g., Russell v. Coffman, 237 Ark. 778, 376 SAV.2d 269 (1964) (exhibition of severed.
preserved kneecap to jury); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp, 50 111.
App.2d 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964) (exhibition of stump of amputated leg to jury); Hanberry v. Fitzgerald, 72 N.M. 383, 384 P.2d 256 (1963) (exhibition of ulcerated ankle to
jury); Morris v. Stanford, 58 Ga. App. 726, 199 S.E. 773 (1938) (exhibition of child to
jury in seduction case); see Christensen v. Powell, 236 Ore. 480, 389 P.2d 456 (1964). In
Christensen the court stated: "There is nothing wrong with demonstrative evidence per se.
It should, however, demonstrate something material to the case," Id. at 457.
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The primary theoretical disadvantage in the courtroom use of hypnosis
is the enhanced susceptibility to suggestion of the witness while under
hypnosis.53 One recent experiment indicated that variations in the examiner's tone of voice alone produced significant variations in suggestibility
while the subjects were under hypnosis.5 4 Furthermore, it has been found
that attitudes of the subject toward the experimental situation of hypnosis
tend to influence the responsiveness of the subject to suggestions given him
while under hypnosis 55 Several researchers have commented that persons
are usually more easily hypnotized when the methods of induction used
are the same as, or similar to, what they expected would be used; however,
at the same time they will not be subject to hypnosis through methods
which they do not associate with hypnosis.5 r This would seem to indicate
a need for a willing expectation on the part of the person to be hypnotized
before successful hypnosis can result. Recent research seems to indicate that
the sex of the hypnotist has very little effect on the performance of subjects
under hypnosis 57 and that even the degree of experience of the hypnotist
may be irrelevant to subject performance in standardized research situatons. 58 This latter research may indicate that the difference in results
achieved by hypnotists in the past on similar experiments was due to a
failure to achieve standardized conditions such as room conditions, hypnotic
induction techniques, trance depth of subject and instructions by the hypnotist.
Nevertheless, the presence of a suggestibility higher than normal in a
hypnotized subject seems to be a generally accepted fact among hypnotists.
Such a high degree of suggestibility could tend to undercut the reliability
of testimony given by a hypnotized witness by the possibility that the witness may be testifying to what he thinks the questioner wants to hear, rather
than what he remembers of the actual event. Because the witness may act
naturally while he gives his testimony, the hypersuggestibility present may
be overlooked by the judge or fact-finding agency. In fact, granted the presence of a very high degree of suggestibility, it may be debatable whether
the testimony of a particular witness under hypnosis is even more reliable
or accurate than his testimony in the conventional state.
VI.

PROPER COuRTRooM USE OF HYPNOSIS

It seems that hypnotic testimony, if allowed in the courtroom subject
to the protections available to opposing counsel, would be preferrable to
53 HuLL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 391; Hilgard, supra note 14, at 158.

54 See Barber & Calverley, Effect of E's Tone of Voice on "Hypnotic-Like" Suggestibility,
in 15 PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS 139-44 (1964).
55 Kuhner, Hypnosis Without Hypnosis, 10 INT'L. J. OF CLN. &Exp. HYPNOSIS 93 (1962).

MARcusE, HYPNOSIS 60 (1959); Moss, op. cit. supra note 45, at 18-19.
Hilgard, supra note 15, at 25.
5s Levitt & Overley, Experience of the Hypnotist as a Factor in Hypnotic Behavior,
18 INT'L. J. OF CUN. &ExP. HYPNOSIS 34 (1965).
5o
57
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the testimony of the hypnotist supported by tapes or written notes. It is

not the hypnotist's testimony which should be subject to attack, but rather
the witness' reactions. But, if the court does not desire the use of courtroom
hypnosis, the judge may order an out-of-court session and then allow the
witness to testify in a conscious state concerning that session. However, the
witness' testimony in this situation would probably be hearsay and his portrayal of the facts could be subject to distortion. His statements would
concern matters not retained in his conscious experience, but extracted
from his subconscious under hypnosis and related to him in his normal
state. And although it is conceivable that the whole set of memories recalled
under hypnosis may be invoked to the witness' conscious memory by the
repetition of his story, it is very possible that he will not consciously remember the experiences, but recall only what he was told about the hypnotic
revelations. Moreover, the testimony would be unreliable because the degree of the witness' suggestibility under hypnosis and the depth of his hypnotic state are not demonstrable in the court. It is in this respect that hypnosis as a memory-aid differs from the more conventional recall aids. For
example, an attorney may find it advisable to jar his witness' memory with
written material prior to trial to avoid any loss of witness credibility in the
eyes of the fact-finder. However, if an attorney desires to utilize hypnosis
only prior to trial, he may be forced to use hypnosis in the courtroom to
prove facts substantiated only by the witness' original hypnotic testimony.
Thus, the attorney could be prevented from using the witness' conscious
testimony as a secondary means of proof for the hypnotic testimony.
Another problem that may be encountered is that hypnosis may not
always be available for use because of particular characteristics of the proposed subject. For example, the witness may be resistant to hypnosis and
difficult, if not impossible, to hypnotize. However, many past cases of unsuccessful hypnosis can be explained today as the failure to use a variety
of hypnotic techniques upon the subject.5 9 Later research indicates that
many subjects have preconceived ideas about hypnotic techniques and tend
to resist hypnosis by any other method. In fact, determination of the "right"

method of induction for the particular subject seems crucial. One way to
avoid the subject's conscious preconceptions is to have him concentrate on
something other than the words of the hypnotist during the induction
period.60 One researcher has been able to hypnotize persons while in their
natural surroundings concentrating on another project even though the
subjects had no prior hypnotic experience.0 1 Recent estimates are that
ninety percent of all subjects can be lightly hypnotized, whereas fifty to
59 TErrELBAuM, op. cit. supra note 15, at

30.

6o TEnEAuM, op. cit. supra note 15, at 15.
61 McCord, Trance Induction Under Unusual Circumstances, 13 Itr'L J. or Cux. &
Exp. HYPNOsIS 96 (1965).
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fifty-five per cent can be deeply entranced. 62 Of course, the depth of the
trance to which the witness is susceptible is of prime concern to the attorney in establishing his witness' credibility. Obviously, the deeper the
trance, the less conscious control the subject will have over his actions.
VII.

TESTS FOR DETECTING SUSCEPTIBILITY TO HYPNOSIS

Several tests have been created to determine a proposed subject's susceptibility to hypnosis. The primary tests are the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, used for general screening purposes, and the Standard Profile
Scales of Hypnotic Susceptibility, used to determine specific factors associated with the individual differences in hypnotic susceptibility.03 By administering one of these tests to a witness, the hypnotist should be able to
determine whether the witness will make a good hypnotic subject. Of
course, the hypnotist can simply attempt to hypnotize the witness and
determine from control tests, such as paralysis of major or minor muscles,
or suggested lack of sensitivity to pain or control of bleeding, the suscepti01
bility of the witness to hypnosis and the potential depth of the trance.
A further use for these control tests may be to determine whether the
witness is in a hypnotic trance at all. Despite the doubts of some researchers, it would appear that attempts in the waking state to pretend or simulate
lack of sensitivity to pain with regard to bleeding, heart rate, muscle control and other physiological measurements have not been as successful as
the control hypnotically possible.65 These control tests, or a satisfactory
substitution, should be required of the hypnotist prior to the courtroom
examination of a prospective witness. In State v. Nebb, the hypnotist
tested the defendant witness by causing sensation of feeling to appear and
62 MARCUSE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 78; Teitelbaum, Personal Injury Law and HypJ. 190 (April 23, Supp. 1), see
TErTELBAUM, HYPNOSIS INDUCTION TECHNICS (1965), where the author observes that "to
obtain recall, where the subject speaks in the past tense while remembering, the medium
depth only is required, while the subject must be in the somnambulistic depth in order
to actually re-experience a prior event." Id. at 155. This means that the added advantage
of recall under hypnotic regression as opposed to ordinary hypnotic recall with reference
to present time would be available for only certain witnesses. However, an Increased
understanding among hypnotists that it is important to standardize induction techniques
and room conditions so that maximum advantage can be taken of other hypnotists'
results has led to greater success in hypnotizing subjects to necessary trance depths with
notism, 1963 Ma. TRIAL TECH. Q. 95, 96; 1955 BRrr. Ma.

specified induction technics.
63 MARcus,, op. cit. supra note 56, at 84; Hilgard, supra note 14, at 168; see Barber,

Measuring "Hypnotic-Like" Suggestibility With and Without "Hypnotic Induction";
Psychometric Properties,Norms, and Variables Influencing Response to the Barber Suggestibility Scale, 16 PsYcHOLOGICAL REPORTS 809 (1965). Barber gives still another test.
64 MARCUSE, op. cit. supra note 56, at 69.
65 See Wells, Ability to Resist Artificially Induced Dissociation, in MODERN HYPNOSIS
75, 77 (Kuhn ed. 1958); Wells, supra note 15; cf. Austin, Perry & Sutcliffe, supra note 12,
at 185.
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disappear in his arms before questioning began, 6 but apparently he did
not test the defendant at any other time during the questioning period.
It would seem more thorough to use a control test upon the witness at
various times throughout his testimony to prevent the witness from gaining
consciousness and substituting present memories for his subconscious ones.
One suggested control test would involve the suggestion of a lack of feeling
in one arm, the subsequent placing of pins in that arm, the suggestion to
the witness that he will be able to control any bleeding in that arm, and
the withdrawal of the pins-one by one-from the arm as the questioning
of the witness proceeds.6 7 As long as there is no bleeding as the pins are
removed, the court can be assured that the witness is actually under hypnosis while he is testifying. If the court or counsel wishes to be assured
that the witness is not only tinder hypnosis, but at a certain trance depth,
the hypnotist could be required to use a control test adequate for that
purpose.
VIII.

QUESTIONING THE HYPNOTIZED

riTNSS

An attorney-hypnotist has outlined how a proper foundation may be
laid for the use of hypnosis prior to trial.68 His suggestions seem equally
applicable to courtroom hypnosis. First, he advises that the examiner obtain a knowledge of the objective evidence and thoroughly examine the
subject before hypnosis to ascertain "his background, his recollection of
the matter in point, his knowledge of hypnosis and any [prior] hypnotic
experiences ....-69 Second, the hypnotist should prepare a written list of
questions, avoiding leading or suggestive questions, to be asked the witness
under hypnosis. Third, the induction of the subject should follow a standard procedure and should include control tests showing that the subject
is in a trance and the depth of this trance. Fourth, the hypnotized subject
should be thoroughly examined by the hypnotist to determine if he has
ever been hypnotized and if there has been any pre-hypnotic suggestions
with regard to telling the truth and the issues involved in the present case.
Fifth, conditional reflexes should be implanted to signal the telling of an
untruth, and the subject should be motivated through suggestion to tell
the complete truth in response to the questions that will be asked of him.
Sixth, if counsel decides that this same witness will testify under hypnosis
in court, copies of all records and a list of questions used should be given

to the opposing attorney along with the opportunity by the latter to examine the witness on these points under hypnosis. Finally, copies of the
records of these activities should be submitted to the court. If a foundation
Transcript, supra note 16, at 24-51.
67 BRYAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 246.
68 TEITEuAUM, HYPNosIs INDUCMON TECHmCS 154-56 (1965).
69 Id. at 154.
66
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is being laid to refresh a witness' present memory about past facts, it may
be necessary to show that the witness does not remember the facts in question independent of hypnosis, or at least is not sure of the facts in question.
Of course, it will also be necessary to obtain written permission from the
witness allowing the hypnotic examination. While there may be other considerations in a particular case, the above outline provides a good working
model of the proper procedure.
There is the additional problem of whether the hypnotist should be the
sole examiner and medium for the attorneys, or whether counsel should
also be allowed to question the hypnotized witness. In State v. Nebb, the
court allowed counsel to examine the defendant under hypnosis,7 0 but it
also allowed the hypnotist to ask questions whenever it appeared that the

71
defendant was having difficulty understanding the attorneys' questions.
The questioning procedure used in this case has been criticized by one
reviewer who implied that this procedure was inherently suggestive. 2
However, it is interesting to note that at one point during the prosecutor's
examination, the defendant stuck to his declaration that he had dropped
the "murder" weapon at the scene of the crime, despite the prosecuting
attorney's implication to the contrary. 78 This persistence could indicate
4
that the problems of suggestibility have been overemphasized.
If the hypnotist alone is allowed to question the witness, each party
should be permitted to provide the examiner with a list of questions he
desires to have asked. There are indications that the hypnotist cannot blot
out the presence of the attorneys from the mind of the witness while under
hypnosis. If this is true, no additional risk is involved in permitting the
attorneys to verbally communicate their questions to the hypnotist as he
carries on his examination. Because of his special training, the hypnotist
may be able to ask more objective questions of the witness so as to preclude
as much suggestiveness through external factors as possible. Even so, it
would appear that the attorney, because of his legal background and court
experience, would be able to tactically arrange his questions and phrase
them to better penetrate to the substance of the witness' testimony. Hence,
the questioning of the hypnotized witness by the respective attorneys, with
appropriate limitations prescribed by the hypnotist and the court is suggested. Perhaps the technique used in State v. Nebb could be employed,
i.e., permitting the attorneys to do the questioning, but as difficulties arise,
the questioning may be assumed by the hypnotist. Whichever alternative

70 Transcript, supra note 16, at 40.
71 Id. at 31-37.
72 'ITELBAUM,

op. cit. supra note 68, 150.
78 Transcript, supra note 16, at 40.
74 See Wells, Experiments in Waking Hypnosis for Instructional Purposes, In HYPNOSIS
IN PERSPECTIVE 85 (Moss ed. 1965).
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is chosen, it must be remembered that unless the attorney and the hypnotist
be one and the same person, close cooperation between the two will be
required to take full advantage of the special talents of each.
IX.

QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR THE HYPNOTIST

Before hypnosis is permitted in a courtroom, some qualification standards for the hypnotist must be established. Hypnosis is a relatively easy
technique to learn, but the skillful use of it to reduce suggestibility to a
minimum, to insure no damage to the subject's personality and to enable
the subject to remember the facts accurately and completely calls for excellent training. In a report by the American Medical Association's Council in 1962 certain standards for the teaching of hypnosis were established 5
These standards were in general agreement with those formulated by the
American Psychological Association a few years earlier. This report emphasized four basic prerequisites for a qualified hypnotist. First, before an
individual may become a trainee, he should be generally examined about
his "background and previous training, motivation, and his own mental
and emotional health and stability." Second, the training should be based
upon an understanding of "symptom-formation, the doctor-patient relationship, and the nature of unconscious mental processes." Third, the trainee
zhould take actual responsibility for carefully selected case-material under
the strict individual supervision of a fully qualified hypnotist and psychiatrist. Finally, the training should be the responsibility of medical schools
and teaching hospitals. The ideal education would be a good undergraduate program which has many points in common with a more specialized
post-graduate program for psychiatrists and a post-graduate program designed for non-psychiatrists. 76 The course structure should call for a minimum of 144 hours of instruction, with a preferred length of one-half to a
full day per week over nine to twelve months. The size of the class should
be small, and particular emphasis should be placed upon the use of
seminars, case conferences and group discussions of required reading assignments. It was also suggested that "patients should be selected and assigned
to provide a well-rounded experience in relation to the type practice of
the trainee .... [and] a complete . . . case report ...required on each
. . . [subject]." 77 A suggested model course of instruction included the
following:
History of psychiatry, history of hypnosis in relation to psychiatry
and medicine, basic psychiatry: general, nosology, psychotherapy, psychodynamics, symptom formation, treatment in psychiatry, and psychosomatic medicine, hypnosis in relation to various forms of treatment,
75 Council on Mental Health, Training in Medical Hypnosis, 180 A.M.A.J. 693 (1962).
76 Id.

at 696.

77 Ibid.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss2/6

18

N/A: Hypnosis in Court: A Memory Aid for Witnesses

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:268

techniques of hypnosis, the hypnotic relations and dangers of hypnosis, indications and contra-indications, uses and potential abuses of
hypnosis, specific applications and modifications of hypnosis, medicolegal aspects of hypnotherapy, the physiology of hypnosis, research
78
aspects of hypnosis, sociocultural aspects of hypnosis.
The Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis has established its own
standard for its members, which includes at least two years of practice or
publication in an acceptable journal. 79 An attorney trained in hypnotism
has suggested that a hypnotist should be "necessarily . . . qualified in induction technics and in approved questioning technics and he should
therefore be qualified in both law and hypnotism." 80
From these recommendations, it can be seen that a courtroom hypnotist
should have an understanding of the general principles of psychiatry with
special emphasis upon subconscious mental processes, a knowledge of approved questioning procedure, and excellent training in hypnosis, either
through completion of an accredited course of instruction or through extensive experience and publication in the field of hypnosis. The American
Psychological Association's Council of Representatives has made a start in
recognizing those persons who have experience in hypnosis by listing Diplomats of the American Board of Examiners in Psychological Hypnosis in
the A.P.A.'s Directory.81
However, the standards of competency recognized above are designed
primarily with an eye toward the problems of medical or psychiatric practice, rather than the particular needs of the law. Therefore, court or statutory regulation of the qualifications for hypnotists would be an excellent
way to provide for the law's demands. At present, there are few statutory
regulations applicable to hypnotists, 8 2 and those generally seek to regulate
stage hypnotism,83 the hypnosis of minors,84 or the medical use of hypnotism.85 What is needed are statutes which recognize the necessity for knowledge of psychiatry, hypnotism and legal interrogative experience. Such
statutes could borrow from the standards of the American Psychological
Association and could add requirements for some legal training. If the
legislature fails to act, the courts could do their part by establishing certain
Id. at 697.
op. cit. supra note 56, at 34.
80 Teitelbaum, supra note 62, at 97.
81 Moss, Logan & Lynch, Present Status of Psychological Research and Training in
Hypnosis: A Developing Professional Problem, in HYPNOSIS IN PERSPECTIVE 169, 178 (Moss
ed. 1965).
82 Brennan, Statutory Regulation of Hypnosis, 14 CLxv.-MAR. L. REv. 112 (1965).
83 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1111 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 167-705 (1961); S.D. CoDr
§ 13.3502 (1939).
84 E.g., S.D. CODE § 13.3501 (1939).
85 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 205A1 (1958); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. Cl. 112, § 6 (1958).
78

79 MARCUSE,
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standards of their own. The court in State v. Nebb allowed a hypnotist
with formal training and nine years experience to question the hypnotized
defendant.8 6 However, legislative regulation would probably be better than
individual court action because a state legislature has better means for
determining the proper standards and a state statute would establish a
uniform rule for all courts within the state.8 7
X. PROCEDURS FOR APPOINTMENT OF HYPNOTIST

Assuming the availability of qualified hypnotists, there remains the
question of the procedures to be used in appointing one or more hypnotists for a particular case. Should there be one hypnotist appointed by the
court to act as the court's representative; or should each party be allowed
to appoint his own hypnotist; or should both parties be required to agree
to the use of a single hypnotist; or should there be a court-appointed
hypnotist with the option available to opposing counsel to alternatively
select one of the other two possibilities?
The utilization of a court-appointed hypnotist provides several advantages. First, it would be easier for the court to insure high qualifications
and experience case after case. Another advantage is that indigent parties
would be able to obtain the services of a hypnotist at no expense. Thirdly,
the use of one hypnotist by the court would enable it to build a backlog
of experience and data based on at least one constant-the hypnotist
86 Transcript, supra note 16, at 9.
87 Although the discussion at present

concerns only the use of hypnotism in the courtroom, proper state regulation need not be this limited. For example, as testimony by
psychiatrists about the mental state of parties to a court action becomes accepted by the
courts, there will be a need for the rules of evidence to be able to deal with the admission
of that part of the psychiatrist's testimony which may be based upon hypnotic anal)sis.
As the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association put
more and more effort into teaching hypnosis and its increasing use throughout the
country, more and more interest will be generated in the possibilities of hypnosis, and
medical professors will begin to depend upon hypnosis for an ever-widening variety of
purposes. The more purposes discovered for its use, the greater the likelihood that
hypnosis will impinge with greater and greater frequency upon the law. Proper state
regulations can cope with this increasing use of hypnosis, as well as facilitate the proper
use of hypnosis to insure greater reliability. See Barber, Antisocial and Criminal Acts
Induced by "Hypnosis": A Review of Experimental and Clinical Findings, in HymPosts

PEsPxcrnvE 100, 107 (Moss ed. 1965), for a demonstration of the use of hypnosis for
criminal purposes. See also IDAHO CODE § 18-201(5) (1947). Can hypnosis be used to "fabricate" witnesses who could be induced to remember false or nonexistent facts implanted
in their minds? Teitelbaum, while recognizing the problem, asserts that a qualified
hypnotist, through careful questioning of the witness under hypnosis, can detect such
tampering. Teitelbaum, supra note 62, at 96-100. Query whether witnesses should be
examined by a court-appointed hypnotist (when possible), prior to their testifying, for
the sole purpose of detecting whether their memories have been tampered with by prior
hypnosis.
IN
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himself-which could prove, at least in the initial stages, the effectiveness
of hypnosis in the legal process. The proper functioning of a courtappointed hypnotist might be suggested by the operation of an analogous
program by a Los Angeles court which has utilized a trained police liedetector operator for use in paternity cases when agreed upon by both
parties.88 On the other hand, several problems might be created by allowing only a court-appointed hypnotist. His extraction of evidence, which
would be of use to one side or the other, could violate our theory of adversarial proceedings. Perhaps this objection could be obviated by allowing
the opposing attorneys to submit their questions to the hypnotist for his
use on the hypnotized witness. Another objection might be that one hypnotist is not as adept as another at administering a particular induction
technique since unlike the lie-detector test, which can utilize a certain
type questionnaire for a variety of subjects,8 9 hypnosis must often utilize a
particular induction technique which, in part, depends upon the personality and expectations of the subject. Still another difference could be that
in any particular case the personal idiosyncrasies of either the hypnotist or
the witness might make it more desirable for a hypnotist other than the
court hypnotist to examine the witness.9 0 Thus, in a given case, one or
more hypnotists might be more desirable than the court-appointed
hypnotist.
88 See Pfaff, The Polygraph:An Invaluable Judicial Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 1130 (1964).
89 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera-

tions, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22, 24 (1964); cf. Inbau & Reid, The Lie-Detector
Technique: A Reliable and Valuable Investigative Aid, 50 A.B.A.J. 470, 471-72 (1964);
Kleinfeld, The Detection of Deception-A Resume, 8 Fay. B. J. 153, 166-67 (1947).
90 See MonE. CODE oF EvmNcE rules 402-10 (1942). Rule 403, providing for the appointment of experts, states:
In an action in which the judge determines that expert evidence will be of substantial assistance, he may, of his own motion or at the request of a party, at any time
during the pendency of the action
(a) order the parties
(i) to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed to give evidence in the action, and
(ii) to submit nominations for their appointment and objections to proposed
appointments, and
(b) appoint one or more expert witnesses of his own selection to give evidence In
the action except that, it the parties agree as to the experts to be appointed, lie
shall appoint only those designated in the agreement.
While rule 403 pertains to the giving of expert testimony, it would seem that the
procedure outlined could be applied to the appointment of a trained hypnotist. Note that
this rule allows the parties to limit the number of experts to be considered by the court
for appointment. This provides the parties protection against arbitrary selection by the
court. Also, the parties have an opportunity to present. objections to having any experts
appointed. Compare UNIFmFoExPERT TESTIMONY Acr §§ 1-2, 4 (1937) (no requirement for
hearing to determine need for expert).
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If each party could use his own hypnotist, this would enable the particular hypnotist to obtain maximum results from witnesses in a specific
case. It would also encourage the use of each hypnotist as a check on the
other to insure maximum satisfaction of controls and questioning procedure through timely advice to their respective attorneys, who could then
object to the questionable practice involved. However, such a procedure
could conceivably lead to a wastage of time and effort by producing stalemates or disagreements between the hypnotists on points which neither the
attorneys nor the court would be qualified to decide. Also, the question of
whether an indigent was being denied due process if he had no hypnotist,
while the other party did have one, could be involved. Of course, this
latter argument could be met by the court through its appointment of a
hypnotist to the indigent at the expense of the state or county or city. However, this in turn might create a further problem in that a hypnotist, at

present, is not considered an officer of the court in the same manner as
an attorney, and therefore is not directly subordinate to a court's requests.

Perhaps some arrangement could be made with local groups or organizations of hypnotists established under proper state licensing or qualification
statutes.
The third possibility, that of having both parties agree to the use of a
single hypnotist for a specific case, is advantageous because it allows the
parties to choose the most suitable hypnotist for their trial, and thus tends
to prevent some of the difficulties which could arise with the above mentioned suggestions. The difficulty with this approach, however, may be
that of maintaining the adversarial system. It is dear that the hypnotist
could be subjected to loyalty pressures because he was retained by both
parties. Such pressures might induce the hypnotist to unconsciously suggest
answers desired by one side to the hypnotized witness.
The fourth alternative would be to have a court-appointed hypnotist,
but also to allow the parties to use hypnotists of their own choosing or to
agree upon the use of a single hypnotist. This alternative tends to establish
a flexible system which allows the use of a hypnotist or hypnotists in the
manner most desired by the parties and consonant with due process. It
is presumed that if the court-appointed hypnotist is well-qualified, the
parties will tend to accept him;91 but the freedom of choice is left entirely
with them. And the fact that the parties could choose their own hypnotists
may tend to insure the selection of a highly-qualified court hypnotist.
The practicality of these alternatives would depend upon the demands
for a trained hypnotist. It has been suggested by several authorities that
many aspects of the law, such as personal injury cases, psychiatric testimony,
and examination of shock and amnesia patients, could use the services of
91 See Pfaff, supra note 88, at 1131.
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a trained hypnotist. 92 Perhaps a trial program in one court could help
determine the wisdom of these alternatives.
XI. COMPARISON OF HYPNOSIS WITH LIE DETEaroRS AND TRUTH DRUGS

The use of hypnotic testimony in court has been grouped by several
authorities with other types of similar testimony, such as a lie-detector
operator's testimony and a subject's testimony gained while under the
influence of "truth" drugs.93 Since none of these other forms of testimony
has been admitted in court over the protest of one of the parties, it has
been concluded by many of these authorities that hypnotic testirpony
should be similarly excluded. 94 The main attack upon the use of hypnosis
has been its effectiveness as a truth finder. Critics have pointed out that
there is no proof that testimony given by a person under hypnosis is 100
percent true. 95 While the necessity of this standard might be challenged
even in the case of confessions (the primary use of the lie-detector), other
grounds exist for distinguishing its use for that purpose from its use on
other witnesses. The former situation usually concerns the determination
of the validity of a confession, which alone may be instrumental in convicting a person in a criminal proceeding. Normally, however, the courts
would be concerned with facts, in both civil and criminal proceedings,
which would not have the near-conclusive effect of a confession. Furthermore, these facts may not be known to only the hypnotized witness, but
may be checked for veracity against the testimony of other witnesses.
While there are similarities between hypnotic testimony and testimony
gained from lie detectors and truth drugs, there are also many differences.
For example, a lie detector measures the involuntary physical reactions of
the subject while he is completely conscious of the questioning. 0 Thus,
while the hypnotist tests for involuntary mental responses and seeks to
exclude the conscious mind, the lie-detector operator is after mechanically
recorded traces of the body itself. Moreover, the hypnotist can question
his witness in court before the judge and jury; the lie-detector operator,
however, must depend heavily on his experience and training to provide a
meaningful analysis of the recordings of his machine, and without this
background, the average judge or jury would be unable to interpret the
results. In fact, it has been noted that even an operator who was trained
92 BRYAN,

op. cit. supra note 21, at 196; Teitelbaum, supra note 62, at 96.

93 WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 243 (2d ed. 1931); see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§ 175 (1954).
op. cit. supra note 93.
95 Alien, Hypnotism and its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REv. 14, 18 (1934); Lcvln,
Hypnosis in the Law, 1964 INs. L. J. 97, 102.
96 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government
Operations, supra note 89, at 33; Laymon, Lie Detectors-Detection By Deception, 10
S.D.L. REv. 1, 14 (1965); Kleinfeld, supra note 89, at 166.
94 See WIGMORE,
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in a different school might not be able to interpret another operator's
results.97 Thus, with hypnosis the judge or jury may make their determinations as to reliability and accuracy directly from the witness who experienced the facts in dispute, while the judge or jury must depend upon the
testimony of the lie-detector operator, indeed a second-hand source.
There are a variety of truth drugs, the more common being scopolamine,
sodium amytal and pentothal. 98 One method of use consists of injections
of the drug at specified time intervals until the subject relaxes, becomes
drowsy and falls asleep. The subject is allowed to sleep a short time and
then aroused. He is then questioned while recovering from the effects of
the drug. Questioning of the subject must be done carefully because the
drug greatly increases the subject's suggestibility and tends to confuse his
conscious mind. Thus, if the questions asked are not brief, there is the
danger that the subject will have forgotten the first part of the question
before the last part is given to him.99 The key to the use of truth drugs is
that a subject under the drug's influence will be unable to recall lies he
may have previously told, and is therefore unable to prevent a consistently
false story.OO In short, it is more effortless for his confused, conscious mind
to tell the truth. Although it is thought that the use of truth drugs impinges upon the conscious mind, it has been observed by one researcher
that he was able to draw from the subject information of which the subject
was apparently not aware. The researcher concluded that the drug enabled
him to "delve . ..into the unconscious mind and bring hidden data to
light." 0 While the use of truth drugs to question the conscious mind
might be said to be subject to the unconscious distortion of past facts
extant in the normal, waking testimony of a witness, the use of such drugs
in questioning the subconscious mind would be quite similar to the use
of hypnosis. Hypnosis can be quicker to apply than truth serums and might
tend to produce more natural reactions by the witness as he answers questions. Furthermore, under hypnosis many witnesses could be regressed
mentally to the time when they observed the facts in issue, and thus distortion caused by the passage of time or subsequent events could be
avoided. It is not claimed that this regression can result from the influence
of truth drugs. Hence, while both hypnosis and truth drugs can lead to
examination of the subconscious mind, the administrative ease and the
97

Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Opera.

tions, supra note 89, at 23-24.
98

See Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence: The So-Called "Truth Serum"

Technique, 42 J. Cant. L, C. & P.S. 513, 520-22 (1951); Expert Psychiatric Testimony
Based on "Truth Serum" Examinations, 1957 1.
L. F. 138, 139.
99 Muehlberger, supra note 98, at 516-17.
oo Id. at 517.
101 Id. at 518.
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increased theoretical absence of distortion would seem to make hypnosis
a preferable means of questioning.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Hypnosis has now been accepted by the American Medical Association
as a valid medical technique; and, as the later cases indicate, some courts
are not unaware of the potential uses of hypnosis in the legal process.
Admittedly, the ramifications of the hypnotic state are not fully understood
at the present time. The thesis of this Note, however, has been that enough
is known to warrant more widespread use of hypnosis in the courtroom.
The validity of this thesis stands or falls upon the resolution of two questions: (1) Can greater reliability be gained through hypnotic testimony
despite the danger of increased suggestibility of the hypnotized witness?
and (2) What is the value of courtroom hypnosis in relation to pre-trial
hypnosis?
Hypnotic regression experiments have suggested that hypnotic testimony
can be more accurate than traditional testimony. The case of State v. Nebbs
indicates that suggestibility may not be as great a danger as has been
theoretically assumed in some quarters. Furthermore, it would appear that
the elimination or adequate judicial control of such forensic tactics as
leading questions, "badgering," "shotgun questioning" and suggestive commentary would minimize the possibility of heightened suggestibility in a
hypnotized witness. Thus, by careful supervision of the control tests and
questioning procedure, a court should be able to protect the reliability of
the testimony.
The greatest value of courtroom hypnosis (rather than pre-trial hypnosis) is that it permits the fact-finding agency to directly evaluate the testimony of the witness who observed the facts involved in the case. Indeed,
with the use of proper hypnotic induction, the witness will testify with all
natural intonation, inflection, gestures and expressions that he would
ordinarily exhibit under traditional circumstances. This, in turn, can provide the fact-finding agency with a more accurate presentation of evidence
upon which to base its decisions.
A. C. R., III
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